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The security of ad hoc wireless networks has become a focal point of the military 
communications research community.  A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is an 
autonomous collection of mobile nodes that communicate over relatively bandwidth 
constrained, wireless links.  Since MANETs require no existing communication 
infrastructure, they offer significant advantages in their scalability and flexibility.  These 
attributes make MANETs extremely attractive for specialized application environments 
such as those encountered on the battlefield, in emergency situations, and in disaster 
areas.  Unfortunately, MANETs also exhibit significant weaknesses in security when 
compared to other wireless communication solutions. They are subject to localized 
attacks and suffer from vulnerabilities inherent to their structure and topology.  
The use of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) offers a cryptographic solution that can 
overcome many, but not all, of the MANET security problems.  One of the most critical 
aspects of a PKI system is how well it implements Key Management.  Key Management 
deals with key generation, key storage, key distribution, key updating, key revocation, 
and certificate service in accordance with security policies over the lifecycle of the 
cryptography.  While traditional PKI solutions work well in fixed wired networks, they 
may not be appropriate for MANETs due to the lack of a fixed infrastructure to support 
the PKI.  In this research, we investigate key management within PKI implementations in 
wireless networks to identify critical factors and best practices to secure these networks.  
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FACTORS IMPACTING KEY MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS IN 
SECURED WIRELESS NETWORKS  
 
 
 I. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
Advances in microelectronic technologies and reduced systems costs have resulted in 
the proliferation of low cost, wireless communication systems across a wide range of 
commercial and military communication solutions.  In some cases, there is a need for the 
rapid deployment of independent mobile users working together towards a common goal.  
Examples include establishing survivable, efficient, dynamic communication for 
emergency/rescue operations, disaster relief efforts, and military networks.  In many of 
these situations, cryptography may be employed to insure the confidentiality and integrity 
of the information carried in the network. 
Key management is a fundamental part of any cryptography system used to secure a 
communications network.  The effectiveness of a cryptography system largely depends 
on the security, robustness, and efficiency of the Key Management System.  Specifically, 
Key Management deals with key generation, key storage, key distribution, key updating, 
key revocation, and certificate services, in accordance with security policies defined by 
the organization using the secure network (Bing, 2005).  
A Key Management System (KMS) is the collective policy, practices, and 
procedures that are dictate the creation, distribution, and management of encryption keys.  
For this reason, the security and integrity of the KMS are fundamental aspects of a secure 




service availability in distributed networks and requires minimal pre-configuration during 
the network deployment.  Security services based on cryptographic mechanisms assume 
cryptographic keys to be securely distributed to the communicating parties otherwise the 
protection provided by the cryptography can be compromised.  Secure key management 
is one of the most critical elements when integrating cryptographic functions into a 
system, since even the most elaborate security concept will be ineffective if the key 
management is weak. 
A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is an autonomous collection of mobile users 
that communicate over relatively bandwidth constrained wireless links (NISTMAN, 
2005).  One unique aspect is that the MANET is formed dynamically and will often 
employ a multi-hop routing communication scheme.  Since the network topology may 
change rapidly and unpredictably over time, each node must incorporate a 
communication routing protocol that facilitates network discovery, insures message 
delivery, and detects and reroutes failed message delivery attempts.  Since the networks 
are formed dynamically, each node should communicate with other nodes within its 
range and collect and distribute this information across the network.  The major 
advantage of this type of network is the self-organizing property which eliminates the 
need for a fixed infrastructure found in other wireless-based networking solutions.  The 
set of applications for MANETs is diverse, ranging from small, static networks that are 
constrained by power sources, to large-scale, mobile, highly dynamic networks.  Since 
MANETs are extremely flexible and scalable they are ideal for establishing 




Further, since the range of the communications network is limited, it appears to be an 
ideal solution for several military applications. 
A security concern in wireless networks is that they are more readily prone to 
eavesdropping than a wired network, as there is no physical protection of the medium.  
Moreover, every node in MANET has increased responsibility in comparison to a node in 
a traditional fixed or mobile network because every node in MANET also serves as a 
router.  The responsibility each node incurs increases the need for security measures to 
assure the confidentiality and integrity of each node.  If a MANET node is compromised, 
it is possible it can act as a gateway to corrupt the entire network.  Further, in some of the 
potential MANET application domain, such as those found in the military or law 
enforcement, security of the communications is a critical requirement.  Moreover, even in 
conventional networks that do not require absolute confidentiality, the general public 
often demand privacy to keep their private information secure. 
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
With the rapid growth of Internet and wireless network technologies, many 
communication services have become the focus for future developments in the military 
operations, law enforcement, and disaster response domains.  Since both Internet and 
wireless communications are transported over what is considered insecure transmission 
media, the messages have to be encrypted to prevent eavesdroppers or unauthorized users 
from capturing the messages.  Therefore, secure communications has become a critical 




no established guidelines that identify best practices for deploying secure 
communications in new network topologies such MANET. 
Security services based on cryptographic mechanisms assume cryptographic keys 
will be distributed to the communicating parties prior to secure communications.  The 
secure management of these keys is one of the most critical elements when integrating 
cryptographic functions into a system, since even the most elaborate security concept will 
be ineffective if the key management is weak (Fumy, 1993).  Key Management is the 
most critical factor of secure communication regardless of the application.  Designing 
and implementing any kind of security mechanism requires a shared secret (usually called 
the cryptographic key) to construct a trust relationship between two or more 
communicating parties.  Managing these cryptographic keys play a vital role in providing 
reliable, robust, and secure communication (Budakoglu, 2004). 
Existing key management solutions are primarily developed based on 
conventional network topologies which are fixed and wired. In such networks, the 
infrastructure provided supports the underlying mechanisms required for effective key 
management.  In contrast, wireless ad hoc networks by definition have no fixed 
infrastructure elements. Moreover, the nodes of wireless ad hoc networks, especially 
sensor network, have several limitations such as memory storage and computational 
capabilities. These inherent disadvantages make it difficulty to employ the tradition 
solution such as the solution based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
The nodes in a wireless ad hoc network are vulnerable to variety of potential 




disrupt the whole network.  One way to mitigate this threat is to implement a 
cryptographic solution with strong key management. 
 
1.3. Research Question 
The purpose of this study is to identify and assess existing key management 
techniques used to secure wireless communication network.  The analysis will identify 
the strengths and weaknesses inherent in each of the key management techniques.  This 
research will also identify critical factors related to key management that influence 
organizational acceptance of cryptography technology in secure communication network.  
It is believed that the identification of these factors will provide guidelines for the 
successful implementation of other wireless secure communications network such as 
MANET. 
In order to satisfy the objective of this study, the primary research question is “What 
are the factors impacting Key Management effectiveness in secured wireless networks?”  
It is hoped that by answering this question, we can recommend guidelines and best 
practices for securing MANETs. 
In addition, there are five investigative questions which allow us to effectively 
answer the primary research question. 
1) What are the characteristics of various secure wireless communications? 
2) What are the most common problems encountered when implementing a secure 
wireless network? 
3) What are the critical success factors in deployment of a secure wireless network? 




5) What is the advantages/weakness of each cryptography technique? 
 
1.4. Methodology 
The research conducted in this thesis uses a hybrid research methodology.  A 
content analysis research methodology is used to examine all literature related to secure 
network deployment and to compare and contrast the key characteristics of secure 
communication networks.  A case study methodology is employed to examine secure 
network implementations in detail and to validate the key characteristics identified in the 
content analysis.  Multiple databases will be queried in order to discover all relevant 
literature related to the key management aspects of securing wireless networks.  Based on 
the collected and evaluated data, critical factors in key management impacting of the 
deployment of secure wireless networks will be identified.  Finally, a comparative 
analysis of the each wireless network topology will be conducted in order to provide a 
better understanding of securing networks so that guidelines can be established for 
mobile ad hoc networks. 
 
1.5. Scope and Limitations 
The scope of this research study is the implementation of secured wireless 
communications.  In this study, the range of secure communication networks examined 
includes wireless networks (WNs), wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and mobile ad-hoc  
networks (MANETs).  
There are a number of limitations of this research.  First, the implementation of 




questions and conducted the categorization of references myself which introduces 
research bias.  Second, there is a lack of substantial information available on MANET 
implementations. This is primary a consequence of the infancy of the MANET 
technology.  Third, I am unable to obtain some of the classified references due to my 
status as an international student.  Therefore, I will analyze all of the unclassified 
references related to securing wireless related network topologies and infer guidelines 
and best practices in MANETs.  Finally, I will focus my research on Key Management 
issues rather than the underlying technical and mathematical details of the cryptography 
used in securing a network.  This research will survey, provide an overview, and analyze 
the literature related to key management aspects of securing WNs, WSNs, and MANETs. 
 
1.6. Thesis Overview 
In this chapter, I have provided a brief introduction of the issues related to securing 
wireless networks.  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 
presents a literature review of all key management related secure wireless network 
literature.  This chapter explains the basic concept of cryptography including key 
management in a secure communications environment.  Chapter 3 describes the hybrid 
methodology used in this study in order to answer the research questions.  In chapter 4, 
we provide a detailed analysis of Key Management techniques and discuss their 
implementation in a secure wireless communication network.  Chapter 5 provides a 
detailed summary of the analysis conducted and provides conclusions and 









In this chapter, we examine all existing literature related to securing wireless 
networks.  The objective of this chapter is to provide common understanding of wireless 
network environment, security, and key management. This chapter will introduce the 
concept of a secure network, introduce the basic concepts of symmetric and asymmetric 
cryptography, and discuss the importance of a Pubic Key Infrastructure (PKI) and its 
relation to key management. The literature review provides the necessary background 
information to understand the importance of key management in a secured wireless 
network environment.  
 
2.2. The Secured Wireless Communications Network Environment 
2.2.1. Wireless Networks (WNs) 
The future of communications has dramatically changed as the result of the 
deployment of low cost, wireless communications technology.  The integration of wired 
and wireless networks has enabled new collaborative communication capabilities that 
link military sensors in theater with command and control systems located thousands of 
miles away. Large numbers of entities participating in these communications require the 





There has been a rapid development in high-speed computing and communication, 
miniaturization of computers, and deployment of wireless communication infrastructures. 
Today, Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) are rapidly and widely accepted as a 
complementary technology to high-speed wired LAN technologies and various cellular 
networks.  WLANs have experienced an amazing development and a rapid growth.  
Advances in these technologies have engendered a new paradigm of computing providing 
flexibility in accessing information anywhere and at any time.  For a wider acceptance, 
WLAN technologies should evolve such that they support QoS (Quality-of-Service) 
provisioning, secure communications, integration with other wireless networks, power 
conservation, seamless mobility support and a fair bandwidth sharing (Labiod, 2004). 
In wireless networks, where the error rate is high and the bandwidth is limited, the 
design of key management schemes should focus on reducing the communication burden 
associated with key updating.  A global wireless infrastructure will free users from the 
confines of static communication networks. Users will be able to access the Internet from 
anywhere at anytime. As wireless connections become ubiquitous, users will desire to 
have secure applications running on their mobile devices (Yan, 2004). 
Network security has received critical attention from various areas. As the data 
network becomes more pervasive and its scale becomes larger, network intrusion and 
attacks have become larger threats to network users. This is especially true for the 
emerging wireless data networks.  Compared to their wired counterpart, wireless 
networks are especially prone to security attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to 
active interfering. It is difficult to protect against intrusions in the wireless environment 




of time (Kong, 2001). Because of wireless links’ specific characteristics, new security 
flaws arise within a WLAN. The necessity of securing WLANs has led to a consensus on 
the definition of newer, more robust authentication architectures. (Bakirdan, 2003). 
 
2.2.2. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) 
As technology advances and the integration of low-power radio, computing and 
sensor technology becomes reality; wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are introduced as 
new type of wireless networks. These networks will typically consist of a lot of ultra low 
power nodes, with limited communication means and CPU power (Kahn, 1999; Rabaey, 
2000). 
Sensor networks consist of a large number of sensor nodes which typically have 
limited resources. They are used to monitor buildings and industries, and they can also be 
used in asset tracking, environmental sensing, etc. Generally, sensor nodes communicate 
with each other through wireless communication; therefore, security services such as 
encryption and authentication are required to prevent eavesdropping, alteration, and 
spoofing (Ito, 2005).  In sensor network, there are many applications like gathering 
distributed information. Typically, the low-power sensors which scattered over the area 
to be monitored have the ability to gather data, and process and forward it to a central 
node for further processing (Jolly, 2003). 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of a large number of small sensor nodes 
equipped with limited computation capacity, restricted memory space, limited power 
resource and short-range radio communication device (Zhen, 2005). WSNs can be used 




collecting vital signs of patients, smart houses, etc. Most of these applications require 
high-leveled security for WSN.  WSN has its own characteristics, such as being prone to 
change; being limited in energy, memory and computation resources; and being subject 
to physical attack.  These characteristics make it a challenging work to design secure 
scheme for WSN (RuiYing, 2005). 
Although the capacities of these sensor nodes are growing, their resources are still 
very limited.  In such an environment, overheads should be kept to a strict minimum, 
nodes should go into “sleep mode” to save energy, and security protocols should follow 
the same “energy-focused” design and consume as little power as possible (Seys, 2005).  
In military applications, sensor nodes may be deployed in a hostile environment such 
as battlefield. Security is challenges for wireless sensor networks, because an adversary 
can easily gain access to mission critical or private information by monitoring 
communications between sensor nodes.  For example, an adversary may try to eavesdrop 
on confidential traffic, to impersonate nodes to insert bogus data, and to cripple normal 
network operation by maliciously modifying routing information.  In order to protect 
WSNs from these attacks, communication should be encrypted and authenticated. 
Therefore, it is important to encrypt communications between sensor nodes to maintain 
confidentiality (Zhen, 2005). 
 
2.2.3. Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET)  
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) are special type of wireless networks where 
mobile hosts in wireless network may form a temporary network without the aid of any 




communicate with each other directly, assuming that all nodes have the same 
transmission range.  On the other hand, nodes outside the range have to use some other 
intermediate nodes to relay messages which create dynamic, multi-hop communication 
architecture.  In such a communication, the packets sent by source host are relayed by 
several intermediate hosts before reaching the destination host (Bing, 2005).  For this 
reason, every node plays a role of a router and must be capable of dynamically rerouting 
and storing messages on an as needed basis.  In order for this network architecture to 
work, there must be a common protocol that all nodes use to achieve reliable 
communications. 
In MANETs, the need for pre-existing infrastructure is not required because each of 
the nodes perform all network services. These nodes can communicate each other 
autonomously.  The error-prone wireless medium and frequent link breakage caused by 
node mobility make the connectivity between the nodes to be irregular.  A fully self-
organized MANET allows the end-users to establish the network solely for a common 
purpose in an ad hoc fashions. For example, a group of strangers with computing devices 
who have never met before might create a self-organized MANET for a common 
purpose.  These strangers have no pre-existing relationships and share no common secret 
keying material on their nodes.  Thus, users within this network have to establish security 
associations between themselves after the network is constructed without any aid of a 
pre-shared keying material or any form of trusted third party (Merwe, 2005). 
Low resource availability demands efficient resource utilization and makes it 
difficulty to use complicate authentication and encryption algorithms. Most often, limited 




enhanced encryption methodologies. Conventional PKI-based authentication and 
encryption mechanisms are relatively expensive in computational power to generate and 
verify digital signatures. This cost often prevents their practical application to use in 
MANETs.  Symmetric key technique has been proven to be more efficient due to less 
computational complexity, but comes with the cost of pre-sharing a secret key (Deng, 
2004). 
One of the main goals of this research is to determine if traditional PKI-based 
cryptography is suitable for used in MANETs.  The inherent infrastructureless nature of 
MANETs makes it hard to provide the capability required in traditional PKI 
implementations.  In addition, another serious problem that occurs in MANETs is the 
physical vulnerability of the nodes themselves. While mobile nodes within an 
infrastructure-based wireless networks have the same vulnerability, they easily receive 
some help with recovery since they can rely on the infrastructure for detection and 
remediation of compromised nodes. In an infrastructure-based network, infrastructure has 
most sensitive information which mobile nodes need in order to communicate and the 
mobile nodes manage only minimal information.  In a MANET, the mobile nodes have a 
higher vulnerability profile since there is no stable infrastructure (Yi, 2002). 
Many target applications for MANETs require strong communication security to 
operate.  Prime examples include battlefield communication support, law enforcement 
communications, and disaster recovery operations which bring together large 
communities of diverse organizations.  However, the same infrastructureless nature of 
MANETs that makes it ideal for easy, fast, and cost-effective deployment also makes it 




(asymmetric) cryptography, the deployment of which requires the effective management 
of digital certificates through two fundamental services: secure binding of a 
cryptographic key to an entity (e.g. a user, a mobile node, or a service) and the validation 
of such bindings to other entities.  Most key management frameworks and other security 
services designed for wired networks and infrastructure-based wireless networks rely on 
a trusted infrastructure for security-related functions. However, in an ad hoc network 
without any infrastructure support, most traditional solutions are not directly applicable 
(Yi, 2004). 
MANETs are a new paradigm of wireless communication for mobile nodes. In a 
MANET, there is no fixed infrastructure such as base stations or mobile switching 
centers. Mobile nodes that are within each other’s radio range communicate directly via 
wireless links, while those that are far apart rely on other nodes to relay messages as 
routers.  Node mobility in an ad hoc network causes frequent changes of the network 
topology.  Figure 1 shows such an example: initially, nodes A and D have a direct link 
between them. When D moves out of A’s radio range, the link is broken. However, the 
network is still connected, because A can reach D through C, E, and F. Military tactical 
operations are still the main application of ad hoc networks today.  For example, military 
units (e.g., soldiers, tanks, or planes) equipped with wireless communication devices, 
could form an ad hoc network when they roam in a battlefield. Ad hoc networks can also 
be used for emergency, law enforcement, and disaster recovery missions. Since an ad hoc 
network can be deployed rapidly with relatively low cost, it becomes an attractive option 





Figure 1. Ad Hoc Mobile Networks (Zhou, 1999) 
Topology change in ad hoc network: nodes A, B, C, D, E, and F constitute and ad hoc 
network. The circle represents the radio range of node A. The network initially has the 
topology in (a). When node D moves out of the radio range of A, the network topology 
changes to the one in (b). 
 
Wireless ad hoc networks have been proposed to support dynamic scenarios where 
no wired infrastructure exists (Yi, 2001). Most ad hoc routing protocols are cooperative 
by nature (Royer, 1999), and rely on implicit trust-your-neighbor relationships to route 
packets among participating nodes. This naïve trust model allows malicious nodes to 
paralyze an ad hoc network by inserting erroneous routing updates, replaying old routing 
information, changing routing updates, or advertising incorrect routing information 
(Marti, 2000). While these attacks are possible in fixed networks as well, the nature of the 





Ad hoc networks are subject to various kinds of attacks. Wireless communication 
links can be eavesdropped on without noticeable effort and communication protocols on 
all layers are vulnerable to specific attacks. In contrast to wire-line networks, known 
attacks like masquerading, man-in-the-middle, and replaying of messages can easily be 
carried out.  Moreover, deploying security mechanisms is difficult due to inherent 
properties of ad hoc networks, such as the high dynamics of their topology (due to 
mobility and joining/leaving devices), limited resources of end systems, or bandwidth-
restricted and possibly asymmetrical communication links (Bechler, 2004). 
 
2.3. Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Cryptography 
Cryptography is a method of storing and transmitting data in a form that only those it 
is intended for can read and process. It is considered the science of protecting information 
by encoding it into an unreadable format for later decryption only by authorized parties.  
Cryptography is an effective way of protecting sensitive information as it is stored on 
media or transmitted through untrusted network communication paths (Harris, 2003) 
Cryptography techniques are used to enable secure communications in both wired 
and wireless networks (Bing, 2005). Symmetric key cryptography has computation 
efficiency, but it also has weaknesses in the management of secret keys.  Asymmetric key 
cryptography is widely used because of its simplicity in key distribution. However, this 
technique relies on a centralized infrastructure and is resource expensive. 
In symmetric key techniques, the sender and recipient have pre-shared a secret key, 
which is used for various cryptographic operations, such as encryption, decryption and 




communicate each other have the same secret key in order to encrypt and decrypt 
messages.  This secret key must be exchanged in a separate out-of-band procedure prior 
to the intended communication. The need to exchange a secret key prior to the intended 
communication complicates the security for transactions between entities that do not have 
a pre-established relationship. Authentication is provided by proving possession of the 
pre-shared secret key to each other.  As the number of keys grows, the administration and 
management of secret keys, including their generation, distribution, renewal and storage, 
can become intractable.  For each pair of entities, a secret key has to be created and 
distributed, so that for a group n entities communicating with each other 
2
)1( −nn keys are 
required (Dankers, 2002).  Figure 2 shows that the number of key required in symmetric 















Figure 2. The Number of Keys Required in Symmetric Cryptography 
 
Because of the need for pre-shared secret keys, secret key based solutions scale 
poorly.  However, a major advantage of symmetric secret key techniques is that they are 




key techniques (Dankers, 2002).  This is the main reason why many applications 
currently still use secret key mechanisms for communication system. Figure 3 
demonstrates the process of symmetric key cryptography. 
 
 
Figure 3. A Symmetric Key Cryptography System 
 
Symmetric key cryptography performs encryption and decryption with a single key.  
The security of this system is thus determined by protecting the "secret key" from 
disclosure.  As such, this is applicable only in situations where the distribution of the key 
can occur in a secure manner.  Many applications often preclude the "safe" distribution of 
the key, and so symmetric-key cryptography is often used in tandem with asymmetric 
cryptography.  Examples of symmetric cryptography algorithms include DES, 3DES, 
Blowfish, IDEA, CAST128, and Arcfour. 
An asymmetric key technique is used for public key cryptography system (Dankers, 
2002). Usually each user has just one key pair consisting of a public key and a private 
key.  One of the keys of the pair is made publicly available, while the other key is kept 
private.  Because one of the keys is available publicly there is no need for a pre-shared 




secure communications between organizations who may want to share information 
securely in the future.  However, there is a need for an infrastructure to distribute and 
manage the public key authentically.  Because there is no need for pre-existed secrets 
prior to a communication, public key techniques are appropriate for supporting security 
between previously unknown parties such as ad hoc network.  Authentication is achieved 
by proving possession of the private key (Dankers, 2002).  A digital signature is one 
mechanism used for doing this.  The digital signature is generated with the private key 
and verified using the corresponding public key, which is bound to the entity generating 
the signature (Dankers, 2002). 
Asymmetric key techniques make it possible to establish secret keys dynamically 
(Dankers, 2002). In simplified procedure, an end-entity calculates a secret key and sends 
it encrypted with the public key of the entity with which it wants to communicate. That 
entity then obtains the secret key by decrypting the received information with its private 
key. As the public key of a key pair is usually published in a directory, the overhead 
associated with distributing key material to communicating parities is reduced 
significantly in comparison with solutions based solely on symmetric secret key 
techniques. For a group of n entities communicating with each other, only n key pairs are 
required (Dankers, 2002).  However, a weakness of asymmetric key techniques is that 
they are computationally very intensive. This intensiveness makes them less suitable for 
environment where devices of size and processing power are limited, such as wireless 





Figure 4. An Asymmetric Key Cryptography System 
 
In asymmetric cryptography, the public and private keys are related to each other, 
but obtaining the private key from its public counterpart is an NP-complete problem and 
is thus infeasible to undertake.  To illustrate how public-key cryptography works, 
consider the hypothetical example of two people named Alice and Bob who would like to 
communicate with each other in private. Assuming Alice already has Bob's public key, 
she encrypts her message to Bob with his public key.  Bob receives the message and 
decrypts it using his private key.  If an eavesdropper, say Eve, were to capture Alice's 
message in transit and re-send it to conceal her presence, she will be unable to decrypt it 
just by owning a copy of Bob’s public key. She can certainly try to obtain the private key 
from the public key but it will take her a prohibitively long time to do so.  RSA and DSA 
are examples of public key cryptographic algorithms.  
 
2.4. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
Public key cryptography is one of most effective mechanisms for providing 
fundamental security services including authentication, digital signatures and encryption 




Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides a means for key management and the infrastructure 
necessary for managing digital certificates. The most important component of PKI is the 
CA (Certificate Authority), the trusted entity in the system that vouches for the validity of 
digital certificate. The success of PKI depends on the availability of the CA to the 
principals in the system (or the nodes in the network) since a principals must correspond 
with the CA to get a certificate, check the status of another principal’s certificate (in some 
cases), and acquire another principal’s digital certificate.  PKI is widely used in wired 
networks and some infrastructure-based wireless networks (Yi, 2002). 
Public key cryptography is uniquely well-suited to certain parts of a secure global 
network.  It is widely accepted that public key security systems are easier to administer, 
more secure, less trustful, and have better geographical reach, than symmetric key 
security systems.  However, it is not widely appreciated that these advantages rely 
excessively on the end-user’s security discipline.  With public key cryptography, clients 
must constantly be careful to rigorously validate every public key they use, and they must 
maintain the secrecy of their long-lived private keys. It turns out that these tasks are 
harder than they seem (Davis, 1996). 
The ubiquitous capability of verifying the binding between a public key and the 
owner principal plays an important role in the successful application of pubic key 
cryptography.  In a communications system, the mainstream solution is to have a third-
party centrally trusted entity, called Certificate Authority (CA), vouch for the authenticity 
of the binding by signing digital certificates.  In practice, CAs and digital certificates are 
organized and maintained by the standards defined by the Public Key Infrastructure.  In a 




be assumed to be significantly more secure than the others. Moreover, devices can roam, 
run out of power, leave and later rejoin a network, stop functioning, all of which lead to 
volatile connectivity among nodes and CAs (Gang, 2004). 
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) consists of program, data format procedures, 
communication protocols, security policies, and public key cryptographic mechanisms 
working in a comprehensive manner to enable a wide range of dispersed people to 
communicate in a secure and predictable fashion.  In other words, a PKI establishes a 
level of trust within an environment.  Formally, a PKI is an ISO authentication 
framework that uses public key cryptography and the X.509 standard protocols. The 
framework was set up to enable authentication to happen across different networks and 
the Internet.  Particular protocols and algorithms are not specified, which is why PKI is 
called a framework and not a specific technology (Harris, 2003). 
Many security protocols in use today were designed under the assumption that some 
form of global distributed public-key infrastructure would eventually emerge to address 
key management problems.  These protocols go back to the early 1990s, when a universal 
PKI was thought to be available in the short term.  Unfortunately, it has not evolved as 
quickly as thought.  Consequently, existing protocols originally designed to rely on a 
global PKI must either employ ad hoc solutions  (Gutmann, 2004). 
 
2.4.1. Certificate Authority  
PKI architectures traditionally fall into three configurations: A single CA, a 




of CAs, the trust relationships between the CAs, and where PKI users place their trust 
(Polk, 2003): 
 
– Single CA: The simplest architecture contains a single CA that provides 
certificates and certificate status information for every user. The CA’s public key is the 
fundamental point of trust, or trust anchor, for evaluating certificate acceptability. 
Users have a direct relationship with the CA, so they know which applications the 
certificates should be used for. 
–  CA Hierarchy: PKIs constructed with superior–subordinate CA relationships are 
called hierarchical PKIs. The foundation of such an architecture is the “root” CA (the 
trust anchor for all users of the PKI), which issues certificates to subordinate CAs but 
not to users. 
– CA Mesh: The traditional alternative to hierarchical PKIs is to create a mesh PKI, 
or web of trust, to connect CAs via P2P relationships. Any CA in a mesh PKI can be a 
trust anchor, although users generally consider the CA that issued their certificate as 
their trust anchor. 
 
2.4.2. Algorithm  
A standard analogy (Mollin, 2003) for public-key cryptography is given as follows. 
Suppose that Bob has a wall safe with a secret combination lock known only to him, and 
the safe is left open and made available to passers-by. Then anyone, including Alice, can 
put messages in the safe and lock it.  However, only Bob can retrieve the message, since 




The key-exchange protocol devised by Diffie-Hellman (Diffie, 1976) did not provide 
a complete solution to the notion give above of a public-key cryptosystem. The first to 
publicly do this were Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA), for which their name are 
attached to the cryptosystem which we now describe. 
We break the algorithm into two parts with the underlying assumption that Alice 
wants to send a message to Bob. The first part is RSA key generation. 
 
(1) Bob generates toe large, random prime qp ≠  of roughly the same size. 
(2) He computed both pqn =  and )1)(1()( −−= qpnφ . The integer n is called hi
s (RSA) modulus. 
(3) He select a random  such that Ne∈ )(1 ne φ<<  and 1))(,gcd( =ne φ . The int
eger e is called his (RSA) enciphering exponent. 
(4) Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, he computes the unique  with Nd ∈
)(1 nd φ<<  such that (n)) (mod 1 φ≡ed   
(5) Bob publishes (n, e) in some public database and keeps d, p, q, and )(nφ  priva
te. Thus, Bob’s (RSA) public-key is (n, e) and his (RSA) private key is d. the i
nteger d is called his (RSA) deciphering exponent. 
Table 1. First Part of RSA Algorithm (Mollin, 2003) 
 
The second part is RSA public-key cipher. This part again is dived into two subparts; 
enciphering stage and deciphering stage. In enciphering stage, in order to simplify this 
stage, we assume that the plaintext message Mm∈  is in numerical form with . 
Also, , and we assume that 
nm <





(1) Alice obtains Bob’s public-key (n, e) form the database. 
(2) She enciphers m by computing  using the repeated squaring m
ethod. 
) (mod nmc e≡
(3) She sends  to Bob. Cc∈
Table 2. Second Part of RSA Algorithm (Mollin, 2003) 
In deciphering stage, once Bob receives c, he used d to compute . 
Moreover, the decryption is unique in that we always recover the intended plaintext. 
) (mod ncm d≡
 
2.5. Key Management 
Cryptography can be used as a security mechanism to provide confidentiality, 
integrity, and authentication as long as the keys are not compromised in any way.  If the 
keys can be captured, modified, corrupted, or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, then 
the whole cryptosystem can become compromised.  Cryptography is based on a trust 
model.  Individuals trust each other to protect their own keys, they trust the administrator 
who is maintaining the keys, and they in turn trust a server that holds, maintains, and 
distributes the keys.   
Key management is a basic part of any secure communication. Most 
cryptosystems rely on some underlying secure, robust, and efficient key management 
system.  Key management deals with key generation, storage, distribution, updating, 
revocation, and certificate service, in accordance with security policies. If the key is 
exposed, the encrypted information would not be protected from malicious attacker. The 
secrecy of the symmetric key and private key must be guaranteed assuredly. Key 




from possible attacks. In the traditional digital envelop approach, one side produce a 
session key and encrypts it using the public-key algorithm. After such a generation and 
encryption, the other side receives and recovers it. In the Diffie-Hellman (DH) scheme, 
communication parties of both sides share some public information and generate a 
session key on both sides. A number of complicated key exchange or distribution 
protocols and frameworks have been designed and built. However, mobile ad hoc 
networks have strongly restricted computation load and complexity of key agreement 
protocol because of node’s lack of available resource, dynamic network topology, or 
network synchronization difficulty. Key integrity and ownership should be protected 
from strong key attacks. Digital signature, message digest and hashed message 
authentication code (HMAC) are techniques used for the data authentication or integrity 
purpose. In the same way, public key is protected by public-key certificate in which a 
trusted entity called certification authority (CA) in PKI vouches the binding of the public 
key with owner’s identity. In systems where there is no trusted third party (TTP), public-
key certificate is vouched by peer nodes in a distributed manner, such as pretty good 
privacy (PGP). Obviously, the purpose of key authentication is that certificate can prove 
the ownership of key rather than decide whether it is good or not. After certain valid 
period of usage, the key could be compromised or disposed. Since key should not use 
again after its disclosure, some mechanism is required to revoke the compromised key in 
not expired period. Certificate contains the lifetime of validity. If the key is expired, it is 
not useful. However, the private key maybe is able to be disclosed during the valid period. 




the network by using the certificate revocation list (CRL) to prevent its invalid usage 
(Bing, 2005). 
Key maintenance is a very important factor in securing a communications 
network.  There is more to key maintenance than simply using them to encrypt and 
decrypt messages. The keys have to be distributed securely to the right entities and 
updated continuously. The keys need to be protected as they are being transmitted and 
while they are being stored on each workstation and server. The keys need to generated, 
destroyed, and recovered properly on demand by authorized individuals.  The keys must 
be stored securely before and after distribution. When a key is distributed to a user, it is 
not going to be located in any location; it needs a secure place to be stored and used only 
in a controlled manner. The keys, the algorithm that will use the key, configurations, and 
parameters are stored in a module that also needs to be protected.  If an attacker were able 
to obtain these components, she could masquerade as another user and decrypt, read, and 
re-encrypt messages that were not intended for her (Harris, 2003) 
A Key Management System (KMS) creates, distributes, and manages these 
certificates. Thus, the KMS is at the heart of the network’s defenses. A KMS provides 
high service availability in highly partitioned networks, requires minimal pre-
configuration during the network deployment phase, and can accommodate new nodes 
joining the network (Hadjichristofi, 2005). 
Cryptographic keys have to be randomly generated. The secret keying material that 
must either be physically secured or enciphered allows protecting itself from disclosure, 
and the authentication of keying material prevents from illegal modification. 




timestamps to also protect from replay of old keys, insertion of false keys, and 
substitution or deletion of keys. All keying material is related to one or more 
subjects/objects of a system. Additionally it intended to be used for some particular 
purpose. A major threat for systems is generated when proper identification of all 
subjects accessing the system is provided. Thus, a key management system is feasible if it 
guarantees the relation between an entity and its uniquely defined keys (Fumy, 1993). 
If the key management has weakness, the security system using this cryptography is 
ineffective. Key management is the most important element of secure communication 
network.  The secrecy of the cryptographic key is essential when designing and 
implementing any kind of security mechanism in order to set up a trust relationship 
between two or more communicating parties. Managing these cryptographic keys play a 
critical role in establishing reliable and robust security communication. Key management 
can be defined as generating, storing, distributing, deleting or archiving keys in reference 
to a security policy (Budakoglu, 2004). 
Key management activities include the generation, distribution or agreement, 
storage, utilization, archiving, deletion, and destruction of cryptographic key material to 
support cryptographically based security mechanisms employed by security protocols. 
Because OSI is concerned solely with the communications aspects of end-system and 
intermediate systems, a key management protocol is limited to the communications 
aspects of key management. An implementation of an OSI key management protocol and 
its supporting security mechanisms must ensure that key material is not disclosed or 
modified during exchanges, and that the key material is protected from insertion, 




The level of security provided by an encryption-based scheme for secure 
communication across a data network is highly dependent on the security of the keys 
used for the encryption and decryption of data. The feasibility of such an updating, 
particularly when end-to-end encryption is contemplated, depends on the existence of a 
key management mechanism that facilitates, at the initiation of each new session, the 
generation of a session key and its distribution to the two end communicants. 
Furthermore, it is desirable that this transfer be made on the existing communication 
channels, which in turn demands the highest level of security during such a transfer. 
Consequently, key management is more important to the working security of a network 
than the mathematical structure of the encryption algorithm itself, since an inefficient key 
transfer between the end communicants can make the entire scheme worthless regardless 
of how complex the encryption itself is (Lu, 1989). 
 
2.5.1. Key Exchange  
Key exchange is the most primitive form of key management.  People wishing to 
communicate over an insecure channel must exchange a cryptographic key.  The use of 
physical key exchange was the earliest form of key management, if it can be described as 
key management at all.  Usually, key exchange is the most inconvenient method of 
creating a secure association between two communicating entities.  However, in some ad 
hoc networking scenarios it is NOT inconvenient but actually a requirement. Thus, for 
small personal area networks or similar scenarios, physical key exchange must be both 





2.5.2. Key Agreement and Group Keying  
Group keying allows multiparty secure communications, and hence provides group 
level authentication and security.  However, providing keying information for individual 
members of the group (i.e. to allow people to communicate privately in the presence of 
other group members) requires other predetermined key agreements.  Indeed networks 
may form where group affiliation doesn’t exist, particularly in a large-scale civilian 
network.  As such, a group key agreement is of limited utility in a non-group oriented 
network, such as a civilian network in which many nodes choose to communicate but 
some require end-to-end privacy.  A public key infrastructure is better suited to this 
scenario (Lehane, 2003). 
 
2.5.3. A Summary of Key Management 
A summary of key management is provided below (Bing, 2005): 
1. The secrecy of key itself must be assured in the local host system.  
2. Secured network communications involved in the key distribution procedure 
between communication parties must be insured when the key may be transmitted 
through insecure channels to maintain key confidentiality and integrity.  
3. A framework of trust relationships needs to be built for authentication of key 
ownership. While some frameworks are based on a centralized Trusted Third 
Party (TTP), other could be fully distributed. For example, a Certificate Authority 
is the TTP in PKI, Key Distribution Center (KDC) in the symmetric system, 
meanwhile in PGP, no such a trusted entity is assumed.  





 III. Methodology 
 
3.1. Overview 
This chapter discusses the methodologies used to conduct this research. In order 
to answer the primary research question, both a content analysis and a case study 
methodology are employed.  In some cases, a qualitative approach may be used. Finally, 
a comparison analysis is provided in last stage in order to offering better understanding of 
results.  Specifically, this chapter will describe the research design, explain why the 
methodology approach is appropriate for this effort, and describe how these data will be 
analyzed to answer the research question presented. 
 
3.2. Selecting Methodology 
Leedy (2001) provides a methodology to select between the Qualitative and 
Quantitative research approaches. Leedy (2001) also enumerates five basic research 
characteristics: purpose, process, data collection, data analysis, and reporting findings. 
These characteristics help the researcher to make a decision so that best approach applies 
to their particular area of study. In Table 3 (Leedy, 2001), there are five general questions 





Question: Quantitative Qualitative: 
What is the purpose of the 
research? 
• To explain and predict  
• To confirm and validate  
• To test theory  
• To describe and explain  
• To explore and interpret  
• To build theory  
What is the nature of the 
research process? 
• Focused  
• Known variables  
• Established guidelines  
• Static design  
• Context-free  
• Detached View  
• Holistic  
• Unknown variables  
• Flexible guidelines  
• Emergent design  
• Context-bound  
• Personal view  
What are the methods of 
data collection? 
• Representative, large 
sample  
• Standardized instruments  
• Informative, small sample  
• Observations, interviews  
What is the form of 
reasoning used in analysis? 
• Deductive analysis  • Inductive analysis  
How are findings 
communicated? 
• Numbers  
• Statistics, aggregated data  
• Formal voice, scientific 
style  
• Words  
• Narratives, individual 
quotes  
• Personal voice, literary 
style  
Table 3. Selection of Methodological Approach (Leedy, 2001) 
 
1) Purpose: Quantitative researchers seek to explain and predicate relationships and to 
develop generalizations. Qualitative researchers seek a better understanding and may use 
their observations to build theory (Leedy, 2001).  
2) Process: Leedy (2001) also discusses the research process. The quantitative research 
processes provides carefully structured guidelines. The qualitative research process is 
more holistic and emergent in design, measurement instruments, and interpretations 
(Leedy, 2001).  
3) Data Collection: Leedy (2001) states that during quantitative data collection, 




from a population. In qualitative data collection, the researchers operate under the 
assumption that reality is not easily divided into discrete, measurable variables.  
4) Data Analysis: For data analysis, all research requires logical reasoning. Quantitative 
researchers tend to depend on deductive reasoning while qualitative researchers make 
considerable use of inductive reasoning. (Leedy, 2001).  
5) Report Findings: In order to report findings, quantitative researchers typically reduce 
their data numbers and employ the power of interpretation. Qualitative researchers 
construct interpretive narratives from their data and try to capture the complexity of the 
phenomenon under study (Leedy, 2001). 
 
By using these questions to determine the proper research approach, the 
qualitative methodology appears to me the most desirable methodology for this research. 
Leedy (2001) explains that research studies are enhanced by combining both qualitative 
and quantitative research approaches. Even if quantitative approach is not designed, this 
study may use some quantitative data that may enhance the qualitative data analysis.  
On the other hand, Yin (2003) states, there are several ways for social science 
research. These consist of: experiments, surveys, histories, analysis of archival 
information, and case study. When choosing a research method, each strategy has 
advantages and disadvantages, depending on three conditions: (a) the type of research 
question, (b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral events and 
(c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena (Yin, 2003). 
Table 4 shows these three conditions and explains how to be related to the five major 





Strategy Form of Research Question 





Experiment How, Why? Yes Yes 
Survey 
Who, What, Where, 




Who, What, Where, 
How many, How 
much? 
No Yes / No 
History How, Why? No No 
Case Study How, Why? No Yes 
Table 4. Strategy for Research Design (Yin, 2003) 
 
3.3. Qualitative Research 
The qualitative study is an inquiry process of understanding a social or human 
problem conducted in a natural setting. The three factors determine the appropriate 
research approach: research problem, personal experiences of the researcher, and the 
audience. The qualitative approach is appropriate to investigate exploratory research 
problems by researchers with experience in literary writing and intending to present their 
results to practitioners (Creswell, 2003). 
In addition, other researchers provide guidelines for selecting the qualitative 
approach. According to Leedy (2001), a case study is a type of qualitative research in 
which information is collected about a single or multiple cases to learn more about an 
unknown or poorly understood state of affairs (Leedy, 2001). Yin state that case studies 
investigate contemporary problems within real-life context to account for pertinent 




Leedy (2001) explains that the relationship between data and methodology is 
inextricably interdependent. For this reason, choosing the appropriate methodology must 
always consider the data that will be collected in the resolution of the problem. To 
accurately state, the research questions, a flexible approach was needed to explore the 
unknown. Patton (2002) explains that qualitative inquiries come from exploration, 
discovery, and inductive logic. An inductive approach is used in this research to find out 
what the important questions and variables are (Patton, 2002). Then, a qualitative 
approach is suitable to answer the research and investigative questions of this 
exploration. 
Quantitative research is used when exploring the relationships between measured 
variables in order to explain, predict, or control phenomena (Leedy, 2001). Moreover, 
quantitative research tries to either prove or disprove hypotheses that are under study. 
Conversely, qualitative research attempts to answer questions relating to the complexity 
of a phenomenon using the participant’s point of view as the basis for explaining or 
understanding the events (Leedy, 2001). Lastly, qualitative research may end with 
hypotheses generated or temporary answers relating to the phenomena under study. The 
qualitative research methodology is used in a lot of disciplines in an attempt to determine 
and explain what has happened or is happening (Leedy, 2001).  
A qualitative approach is appropriate when developing new insight about a 
phenomenon (Leedy, 2001). In the case of this research, the phenomenon is the 
environment of secure network such as mobile ad hoc network and the insights are the 
security issues on such a secure network. Because the data for this research is obtained 




text (Denzin, 2000). They list six methodologies that could be used for this type of data, 
but suggest content analysis as the most appropriate research method for this type of data 
(Denzin, 2000). Leedy (2001) agrees with this description of content analysis as a 
detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a particular body of material for 
the purpose of identifying patterns (Leedy, 2001). By analyzing text, the researcher finds 
codes or the intent of what is written (Leedy, 2001). Neuendorf (2002) also concurs by 
stating that a content analysis is a systematic, objective, quantitative, analysis of message 
characteristics. Each of these definitions shows that content analysis is an appropriate 
methodology in order to satisfy the purpose of this research. Thus, content analysis was 
chosen as the best methodology to answer the questions posed in this study.  
 
3.4. Case Study 
The case study is especially suitable for learning more about a poorly understood 
situation (Leedy, 2001). The case study strategy is used when the research satisfies the 
following three conditions: the research questions must be in the form of how or why, the 
researcher must not have any control over events, and the study must focus on a 
contemporary event or problem (Yin, 2003). 
Yin (2003) defines the appropriateness of case study as a research method by 
providing the following technical definition: A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003). 
Leedy (2001) also supports the use of a case study in situations when its unique or 




and a case study may be especially suitable for learning more about a little known or 
poorly understood situation (Leedy, 2001). 
A number of definitions for the case study methodology have existed over the 
years. In case studies, the researcher explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a 
process, or one or more individuals. The case (or cases) is bounded by time and activity. 
Researchers gather detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures 
(Stake, 1995).  
The case study approach to qualitative research constitutes a specific way of 
collecting, organizing, and analyzing data (Patton, 2002). In a case study, a particular 
individual, program, or event is studied in-depth for a defined period of time (Leedy, 
2001). The researcher will investigate a topic when the theory base is unknown 
(Creswell, 2003). The researcher tries to test the validity of certain assumptions, claims, 
theories, or generalizations within real-world contexts (Leedy, 2001). 
A lot of the definitions of case study exist (Leedy, 2001; Patton, 2002; Stake, 
1995; Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) states that the case study constructs an all-encompassing 
method and it include the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific 
approaches to data analysis. Regardless of the chosen definition, Benbasat (1987) explain 
that the case study is suitable to capture the knowledge of practitioners and to develop 
theories. Benbasat (1987) listed eleven characteristics of case studies. Table 5 is the 
eleven characteristics. These characteristics of the case study method were related to the 





1. Phenomenon is examined in a natural setting. 
2. Data are collected by multiple means. 
3. One or few entities (person, group, or organization) are examined. 
4. The complexity of the unit is studied intensively. 
5. Case studies are more suitable for the exploration, classification and hypothesis 
development stages of the knowledge building process; the investigator should 
have a receptive attitude towards exploration. 
6. No experimental controls or manipulation are involved. 
7. The investigator may not specify the set of independent and dependent variables 
in advance. 
8. The results derived depend heavily on the integrative powers of the investigator. 
9. Changes in site selection and data collection methods could take place as the 
investigator develops new hypotheses. 
10. Case research is useful in the study of “why” and “how” questions because these 
deal with operational links to be traced over time rather than with frequency or 
incidence. 
11. The focus is on contemporary events. 
Table 5. Key Characteristics of Case Studies (Benbasat, 1987) 
 
A case study is an ideal methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation is 
needed (Feagin 1991). The case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but 
only when the relevant behaviors cannot be influenced (Yin 2003). Case studies are 
designed to bring out the details from the viewpoint of the participants by using multiple 





3.5. Comparison Analysis 
In final stage of completing this study, a comparative analysis of the usability of 
guidelines created from the qualitative literature review will be performed. Patton (2002) 
states, that understanding unique cases can be deepened by a comparative analysis. 
Comparisons can also be important in illuminating differences between programs in 
evaluation (Patton, 2002). In this study, the key management strategy used in each secure 
network environment will be compared and analyzed to determine 1) which is better then 
others, 2) if one is abstractly secure, and/or 3) if one has good characteristics in particular 
environment will it satisfy the requirements of the others. 
 
3.6. Content Analysis 
3.6.1. Definition of Content Analysis 
Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use. As a 
technique, content analysis involves specialized procedures. It is learnable and 
divorceable from the personal authority of the researcher. As a research technique, 
content analysis provides new insights, increases a researcher’s knowledge of particular 
phenomena, or informs practical actions (Krippendorff, 2004). 
 
3.6.2. Advantages of Content Analysis 
Compared with other data-generating and analysis techniques, content analysis has 




1. Communication is a central aspect of social interaction. Content analytic 
procedures operate directly on text or transcripts of human communication. 
2. The best content analysis studies use both qualitative and quantitative operations 
on texts. Thus content analysis methods combine what are usually thought to be 
antithetical modes or analysis. 
3. Documents of various kinds exist over long periods of time. Culture indicators 
generated form such series of documents constitute reliable data that may span 
even centuries. 
4. In more recent times, when reliable data of other kinds exist, culture indicators 
can be used to assess quantitatively the relationships among economic, social, 
political, and cultural change. 
5. Compared with techniques such as interviews, content analysis usually provides 
unobtrusive measures in which neither the sender nor the receiver of the message 
is aware that it is being analyzed. Hence, there is little danger that the act of 
measurement itself will act as a force for change that confounds the data. 
 
3.6.3. Issues in Content Analysis 
A central idea in content analysis is that the many words of the text are classified into 
much fewer content categories. Each category may consist of one, several, or many 
words. Words, phrases, or other units of text classified in the same category are presumed 
to have similar meanings. Depending on the purposes of the investigator, this similarity 
may be based on the precise meaning of the words, or may be based on words sharing 




classification procedure be reliable in the sense of being consistent. Different people 
should code the same text in the same way. Also, the classification procedure must 
generate variables that are valid. A variable is valid to the extent that it measures or 
represents what the investigator intends it to measure (Weber, 1990). 
 
3.6.4. The Nine Step Process of Content Analysis 
In the content analysis methodology, the researcher identifies the specific material 
to be analyzed and how to precisely code that material (Leedy, 2001). Then the 
researcher uses quantitative analysis techniques to a matrix of these coded entries to 
construct the central themes across the data (Denzin, 2000). Neuendorf (2002) suggests 





1. Theory and rationale: What content will be examined, and why? Are there certain 
theories or perspectives that indicate that this particular message content is important to 
study? Library work in needed here to conduct a good literature review.  
↓ 
2. Conceptualizations: What variables will be used in the study, and how do you define 
them conceptually? There are many way to define a given construct, and there is no one 
right way.  
↓ 
3. Operationalizations: Your measure should match your conceptualizations. What unit 
of data collection will you use? An a priori coding scheme describing all measures must 
be created. Both face validity and content validity may also be assessed 
↓ 
4. Coding schemes: You need to create the following materials. 
a. Codebook (with all variable measure fully explained) 
b. Coding form 
↓ 
5. Sampling: is a census of the content possible? How will you randomly sample a subset 
of the content? This could be by time period, by issue, by page, by channel, and so forth. 
↓ 
6. Training and pilot reliability: During a training session in which coders work 
together, find out whether they can agree on the coding of variables.  
↓ 
7. Coding: Use at least two coder, to establish intercoder reliability. Coding should be 
done independently, with at least 10% overlap for the reliability test. 
↓ 
8. Final reliability: Calculate a reliability figure for each variable. 
↓ 
9. Tabulation and reporting: See various examples of content analysis result to see the 
ways in which results can be reported. Figures and statistics may be reported one variable 
at a time, or variables may be cross-tabulated in different ways. 





3.7. Research Design 
3.7.1. Theory and rationale 
This step explains what references will be examined and why they are selected. 
The focus of the content analysis is to include all of the articles related to key 
management in secure wireless network. The reference materials will be collected using 
various sources. Generally, the intentions of the researcher can cause certain references to 
be included or excluded, which can be the source of significant bias. In order to reduce 




This step describes what variables will be used in the research and how they will 
be conceptualized (Neuendorf, 2002). In order to answer the research questions, each of 
the secure wireless network environments including the Wireless Network (WNs), 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSNs), and Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are 
explained. The basic concepts of cryptography used in each of the wireless networks are 
described to provide insight into how the network is secured. The review chapter 
provides an explanation of the Public Key Infrastructure which is the most effective 
mechanism process for implementing Key Management. 
 
3.7.3. Operationalizations 
In this step, the unit of measure employed in this research is defined. This unit of 




the reference article as the unit of measure. In order to reduce researcher input into 
selecting process, there is no weight and no bias based on the author or source. However, 
since the primary researcher could not examine all of the related references, only a subset 
of all possible references was used in this research. 
 
3.7.4. Coding schemes 
The coding scheme is used to analyze and categorize the data. Once all relevant 
references are identified, the references will be coded to indicate if they provide 
information on the characteristics of wireless networking and/or key management in a 
secured wireless network.  The words used in searching are “key management”, 
“security”, and “cryptography”. In order to decide whether this is related to our key issue, 
the three codes are employed, as follows: 
 
0 Not mentioned – the issue is not mentioned at all in the material 
1 Mentioned - the issue is merely mentioned in the material 
2 Key Idea – the idea is fully developed and is the focus of the paper 
 
From this analysis, the list of important related issues were generated and stored. 
These issues were used by the research coders in order to analyze the material. The 
researcher analyzed and assessed the existence of these issues contained in the key issue 






Since it is impossible to execute a complete census of the reference population, a 
random selection process was provided to collect data used in the content of the research 
(Neuendorf, 2002). In order to identify Key Management issues in secured wireless 
networks, a subsample of all related available literatures will be collected.  The primary 
source of material for this study will be obtained from the Association for Computing 
Machinery (ACM; http://www.acm.org/) and Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE; http://www.ieee.org/portal/site).  In addition, the online research 
database in the AFIT Academy Library (http://www.afit.edu/library/) will be used to 
identify other significant resources to be used in this research. 
For each reference, the title and abstract of the material are examined.  If this 
material includes the concepts related to the research, the reference is read in its entirety. 
If the material is relevant, the reference is classified into wireless network (WNs, WSNs, 
and MANETs), key management (WNs, WSNs, and MANETs). 
 
3.7.6. Training and pilot reliability 
This section explains the role of research coders in performing their analysis. In 
this research, the research coders did not exist. Ideally, several coders are required in 
order to provide the reliability. Due to the limitations of obtain volunteers who have 
enough background related to wireless networks, security, and cryptography to evaluate 






From the references related to general key management, the problem and critical 
issues of Key Management are examined and stored. These issues are recorded using the 
tool such as Microsoft Office Excel 2003. These issues were numbered, (e.g. Factor-1, 
Factor-2, … / Problem-1, Problem-2, …) While the selected are examined, if the ideas 
related to issues is found, the number of the issues are counted in the spreadsheet of 
Microsoft Office Excel 2003. The counted numbers of each issue are analyzed and 
interpreted in order to identify the main problems and factors of Key Management in 
each secure wireless network. 
 
3.7.8. Final reliability 
To make valid inferences from the text, it is important that the classification 
procedure be reliable in the sense of being consistent: different people should code the 
same text in the same way (Weber, 1990). Comparing the result of the primary researcher 
with ones of several coders provide the measure of reliability in validating the results. 
Since there are no coders to validate the results in this research, it is not possible to obtain 
the measure of reliability. However, this research attempted to obtain the key issues from 
a variety of references in order to examine various authors’ opinions related to Key 
Management. 
 
3.7.9. Tabulation and reporting 
In the final step, the results of the study are tabulated and reported (Neuendorf, 




Excel 2003. These results were transferred into pie chart in order for displaying them 
visually. These findings will be interpreted and discussed in chapter IV and chapter V. 
 
3.8. Research Limitations 
The results of this study are subject to limitations based upon constraints 
encountered in the research process.  First, as with all qualitative research, the researcher 
plays a major role as key instruments in this study (Leedy, 2001). As a result, the intent 
of researcher can drastically have an effect on the research results in a lot of ways. This 
bias of researcher includes some issues such as researcher background, previous 
knowledge, personal predispositions, researcher skill, and competency (Leedy, 2001). 
Because of importance of researcher’s role, it is impossible to completely remove all bias. 
In order to reduce this effect, all researchers should have an indirect position when 
conducting their analysis. Consequently, reducing researcher bias and choice is 
significant factor to provide good results.   Unfortunately, in this study the author both 
formulated the research questions and conducted the content analysis without additional 
help in coding references. 
Second, there is no way to perfectly obtain all written material concerning the key 
management in a secured network environment.  There is limited and restricted factor to 
explore the related field in conducting this research. This issue must be considered when 
the researcher makes conclusions from these results (Leedy, 2001). Further, there is very 
little literature available about MANETs in general that contains substantial information 




Third, some of the references that discuss securing wireless networks are 
classified and unavailable to an international student.  This may result in some newer 
developments not being included in this research. 
Finally, an inability to generalize the findings and results is another limitation of 
this research. This research targets only wireless network environment and does not 
attempt to generalize to other network environment. Thus, the guideline provided by this 
research may not be suitable for combined network environment and new wireless 





 IV. An Analysis of Key Management 
 
4.1. The Secure Network Environment 
4.1.1. Overview 
In this study, we focus our attention on secure wireless networks. Specifically, our 
scope is limited to wireless networks (WNs), wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and 
mobile ad hoc network (MANETs).  In order to present the characteristics of each secure 
network environment, a content analysis comprised of fifty-six salient documents was 
conducted. A list of references is contained in Appendix A. 
 
4.1.2. Wireless Networks (WNs) 
Characteristics (Advantage) 
Wireless networks are being deployed ubiquitously at a remarkable pace. Low 
cost, ease of operation, platform independence, and product variety make them appealing 
to everybody (Godber, 2002). Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) will facilitate 
ubiquitous communications and location independent computing in restricted spatial 
domains. The main attractions of wireless network include: cost effectiveness, ease of 
installation, flexibility, tether-less access to the information infrastructure, and support 
for ubiquitous computing through station mobility (Park, 1998). 
Schmidt (2003) explains the characteristics of WLANs as requiring zero 
configurations, ubiquity, and the ease of the creation of mesh networks. Karnik (2005) 





- Financial benefits: Intel Corporation conducted an analysis concluding that wireless 
networks offer significant savings in two financial areas such as Total Cost of 
Ownership (TCO) and Return on Investment (ROI).  
- Performance benefits: Wireless networks also offer performance benefits in terms of 
increased accuracy and productivity 
The IEEE has specified various WLAN standards, some of which are 
summarized below in Table 7 (Schmidt, 2003): 
 
Standard Description Application 
802.11a 
• 5 GHz 
• 12 Channels 
• 22 Mbps 
• Large-scale corporate environment 
• Less interference 
• Higher performance 
802.11b 
• 2.4 GHz 
• 3 Channels 
• 11 Mbps 
• Hot Spots & Residential environment 
• Lower speed 
• Low cost & Variety of products 
802.11g 
• 2.4 GHz 
• 3 Channels 
• 54 Mbps 
• Compatible with 802.11b 
• Higher speed 





Wireless networks provide convenience and low-cost deployment. However, 
they lack any inherent means of strong security (Allen, 2002). The standards committee 
for wireless network left many difficult security issues such as key management and a 
robust authentication mechanism as open problems. The fact that wireless networks 
provide a network access point for an adversary creates critical security problem. The 
end-to-end problem (easy access) affects wired as well as wireless security. However, it 
is much greater threat in wireless network because the attacker has easy access to the 
transport medium (Arbaugh, 2003). 
A wireless network can be as secure as a wired network if security guidelines are 
implemented and enforced strictly. One of the major problems to provide secure network 
environment in wireless network is that wireless media are inherently less secure 
(Bharghavan, 1994). Security over a wireless environment is more complicated than in a 
wired environment. Due to the wide open nature of wireless radio, many attacks could 
make the network insecure (Chen, 2005). 
Due to the nature of a wireless network, wireless communication is unprotected 
and can easily be eavesdropped on or even spoofed (Eisinger, 2005). Since in wireless 
LANs the bandwidth and the computing resources are limited, complex cryptographic 
protocols such as those requiring extensive computations and transmissions can not be 
considered (Park, 1998). 
The Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol was designed to provide 
confidentiality for network traffic using the wireless protocol. However, when WLANs 




provide wired-equivalent privacy on a wireless network. A wireless solution that uses 
WEP works in conjunction with another security system to provide the authentication and 
accounting necessary. Even in those situations, WEP does not perform the encryption 
necessary to consider a wireless network secure. Open source and freeware programs are 
easily available that crack and decode WEP sessions. Universities provide ideal 
incubators for such network subversion (Allen, 2002). 
 
4.1.3. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) 
Characteristics (Advantage) 
A sensor is a miniature device capable of detecting environmental conditions 
such as temperature, sound, humidity, seismic tremors, or the presence of certain objects. 
Sensors incorporate sensing, low-power data processing, and low-power wireless 
communication capabilities (Olariu, 2005). Wireless Sensor networks is an emerging 
paradigm of computing and networking where a node may be self-powered, and have 
sensing, computing, and communication capabilities (Bai, 2004). 
The main driving forces for wireless sensor networks are fault tolerance, energy 
gain and spatial capacity gain. A wireless sensor network provides a suitable interface for 
interaction, physical control, information harvesting and exchange (Bilstrup, 2003). In 
sensor networks, it has many advantages to replace cables with wireless logical links. Its 
key features are robustness, low complexity, low power and low cost. A restriction of a 
position to set up sensor nodes disappears and it has more advantages to maintain, mend 




Being characterized by their low-power, small size, and cheap price, sensor 
nodes are capable of wireless communication, sensing and computations (Dai, 2005). 
Wireless sensor nodes have emerged as a result of recent advances in low-power digital 
and analog circuitry, low-power RF design and sensor technology (Rajaravivarma, 2003). 
Wireless sensor network have enabled the development of low-cost, low-power, 
multifunctional sensor nodes that are small in size and communicated in short distances. 
Sensor networks are highly vulnerable to security attacks (Tie, 2005). 
 
Weakness 
Remote wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to malicious attacks. While 
wired and infrastructure-based wireless networks have mature intrusion detection systems 
and sophisticated firewalls to block these attacks, wireless sensor networks have only 
primitive defenses. Wireless networks require innovative medium access techniques to 
share the limited broadcast bandwidth in a fair and efficient manner as computing and 
communications devices continue to proliferate (Brownfield, 2005). 
One of the major barriers to deploying security on sensor networks is that current 
sensor devices have limited computation and communication capabilities. They are 
vulnerable to attacks which are more difficult to launch in the wired domain. Sensor 
networks are vulnerable to resource consumption attacks (Karlof, 2004). These sensors 
are inexpensive, low-power devices. As a result, they have limited computational and 
communication resources (Perrig, 2002). 
When sensors are deployed in a hostile place like a battlefield, they are subject to 




of a sensor and compromise the cryptographic keys. The amount of key-storage in each 
sensor is highly limited; it is not capable to store keys with every other sensor. Typical 
sensor network platforms have very low bandwidth. Transmission reliability is often low, 
making the transmission of large blocks of data particularly expensive (Chen, 2005). 
 
4.1.4. Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) 
Characteristics (Advantage) 
An ad hoc WLAN has no ability to communicate with external networks without 
using additional routing protocols (Housley, 2003). Mobile ad hoc networks are 
infrastructure-free, pervasive, and ubiquitous without any centralized authority 
(Alampalayam, 2005). Ad hoc networks characteristics (dynamic topology, 
infrastructureless. variable capacity links. etc.) are origin of many issues (Bouam, 2003). 
The most important characterizing feature of a MANET is the absence of any node in a 
central role (Manikopoulos, 2003). 
Interest in ad hoc networks largely stems from the ability to rapidly deploy them 
under both normal and harsh conditions. These networks can be quickly deployed in 
situations where no infrastructure exists and it would be impractical or infeasible to 
deploy infrastructure. In such an infrastructure-less network, nodes are expected to 
cooperate to perform essential networking tasks such as routing (Aboudagga, 2005). 
Ad hoc networks require no centralized administration or fixed network 
infrastructure such as base stations or access points, and can be quickly and inexpensively 




characteristics: Dynamic topologies, Bandwidth-constrained, Variable capacity links, 
Energy constrained operation, Limited physical security (Yi, 2004). 
 
Weakness 
The lack of a clear line of defense and traffic concentration points poses a 
challenge to deploying security solutions in ad hoc networks. The broadcast nature of the 
transmission medium and the dynamically changing topology add even more 
complications. Furthermore, the reliance on node collaboration as a key factor of network 
connectivity presents another obstacle (Aboudagga, 2005). Ad hoc network routing 
protocols are challenging to design, and secure ones are even more so. The protocols also 
have high communication overhead because they send periodic routing messages even 
when the network is not changing (Hu, 2002). 
MANETs bring great challenges in security due to its high dynamics, link 
vulnerability, and complete decentralization (Jiang, 2004). Major challenge is that of the 
compromised node(s); this could be an overtaken attacked node or a physically captured 
node (Manikopoulos, 2003). Ad hoc networks can be highly dynamic since wireless 
nodes are free to move about. Furthermore, wireless nodes have limited battery life and 
computational power to face these challenges (Suen, 2005). The problem is challenging 
due to the lack of centralized management/monitoring component, error-prone multi-hop 
wireless communication, and dynamics in the network topology (Yang, 2002). The ad 
hoc networks are susceptible to attacks due to wireless links, energy constraints, and 
difficulty to self-configure because of the mobility (Xie, 2004). Table 8 explains various 





Type of attack Method Authentication Routing Selfish DoS Open Issues 
GDH 
(Capkun, 2003) Yes No No No 
Mechanism for certificate 
issues 
MOCA  
(Yi, 2002) Yes Yes No No Does not use the support of PKI 
CORE 
(Michiardi, 2002) No No Yes No 
Considers only selfish node 
attack 
Nuglets 
(Buttyan, 2003) Yes Yes Yes No Scheme is not generalized 
CONFIDANT 
(Buchegger, 2002) No Yes Yes No 
Assumes nodes are 
authenticated 
Guardian Angel 
(Avoine, 2002) Yes No Yes No Does not support varied attacks 
TIARA 
(Ramanujan, 2000) Yes Yes No Yes Not a generalized scheme 
SEAD  
(Hu, 2002) Yes Yes No Yes Packet forwarding 
Beacon 
(Binkley, 2001) Yes Yes No No 
Scalability and Key 
Management 
SOS  
(Yang, 2002) Yes Yes No Yes Scalability issues 
SRP 
(Papdimitratos, 2002) Yes Yes No Yes Unfair utilization of resources 
ARIADNE 
(Hu, 2002) Yes Yes No Yes Not optimized 
SAR  
(Yi, 2002) Yes Yes No No Packet mistreatment attacks 
OSRP 
(Awerbuch , 2002) Yes Yes No No Fixed but not adaptive threshold 
WatchDog/ Pathrater 
(Marti, 2000) No Yes No No 
Assumes no a priori 
relationship 






Table 9 shows the advantage and weakness of each network environment. 
Wireless networks (WNs) have infrastructure which support stronger security than other 
wireless networks. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have sensor nodes with limited 
resources, which provide low cost and easy installation, and restricted computation 
capabilities. In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), there is no infrastructure. Although 
this enables MANETs to be pervasive and ubiquitous, it creates a number of security 
problems. These characteristics provide useful background information in order to 
construct and design secure wireless networks. 
 
 Advantage Weakness 
WN 
Ubiquitous deployment, low-cost, 
easy operation, dependent platform 
(computing), flexibility , financial 
and performance benefits 
- The bandwidth and the computing 
resources are limited. 
- These natures of wireless network 
make the system to be less secure. 
WSN 
Robustness, self-powered, low-
power, low-cost, easy maintenance 
Vulnerability to malicious attacks, 
requirement of innovative medium 
, limited computational and 
communication resources 
MANET 
- No need of additional routing 
protocol and dynamic topology 
- Infrastructure-free, pervasive, and 
ubiquitous without any centralized 
authority 
- The lack of a clear line of defense 
and traffic concentration points 
- High communication overhead  
- Great challenges in security due 
to its high dynamics, link 
vulnerability, and complete 
decentralization 





4.2. Key Management Problems 
4.2.1. Overview 
In order to identify key management in existing secure network deployments, 
twenty-eight references (see Appendix B) related to key management were identified and 
examined.  In this section, we will detail the problems identified in Key Management. 
Additionally, I identified fifty-six references which discuss key management in of each 
secure network type in detail.  A content analysis of the references is conducted and 
discussed to identify the critical factors which affect the success of Key Management in 
secure wireless network implementations from related 56 documents (See Appendix C). 
 
4.2.2. Key Management Problems 
One central problem of key management is key distribution, i.e., the problem of 
establishing keying material whose origin, integrity, and-in the case of secret keys-
confidentiality can be guaranteed. The problem with the concept of trust is that there is no 
formal understanding of it. The amount of trust required of course depends to some 
extent on the type of key management server (Fumy, 1993). Key management, in general, 
can be a difficult problem because of issues as: Distribution of keys; Distribution of lists 
containing revoked keys; Tracking which keys were valid during what period of time 
(Witzke, 1994). 
A weak tie between a key and its owner invites Man In The Middle (MITM) 
attacks, which may succeed if the system can’t distinguish communications with an 




When the number of services one has to access increases, key management 
becomes a serious problem due to the fact that each membership-based service has a 
different secret token and the memory space on each card is very limited (Harn, 1993). 
Public key cryptography generally consumes lots of resources such as computation and 
communication, which is not believed suitable for pervasive computing due to the limited 
capabilities of pervasive devices (He, 2005). Furthermore, some of the key management 
protocols being standardized are single purpose, intended for a specific OS1 layer 
(Jansen, 1993). 
All key-recovery systems require the existence of a highly sensitive and highly 
available secret key or collection of keys that must be maintained in a secure manner over 
an extended time period. These systems must make decryption information quickly 
accessible to law-enforcement agencies without notice to the key owners. These basic 
requirements make the problem of general key recovery difficult and expensive—and 
potentially too un-secure and too costly for many applications and many users (Neumann, 
1997). The key-management problem mainly concerns minimizing the cost of key update 
communications and key storage requirements (Tseng, 2003). 
Key management remains the primary obstacle to the wide-scale use of 
cryptography (Reiter, 1996).With symmetric systems, the movement of keys from place 
to place obviously must be done securely and with a level of protection adequate to 
counter the threats of concern to the using parties. The private keys are usually self-
generated, but they may also be generated from a central source, such as a corporate 




among locations under a common line of authority, key management is an internal or 
possibly a joint obligation (Dam, 1996). 
 
4.2.3. Result and Analysis 
The problems we identified in key management identified are summarized in 
Table 10 below.  
 
1. Key distribution and the concept of trust 
2. Weak relationship between keys 
3. Different secret scheme  
4. Limited memory storage and resource 
5. Insufficient standard of key management 
6. Difficult and expensive key recovery 
7. Increasing cost of key management 
8. Difficulty to apply wide-used cryptography 
Table 10. The Problems of Key Management 
 
Throughout a majority of references, the authors state that main problem is the 
distribution of the secret key.  Most cryptography systems use the concept of key in order 
to support security. In a symmetric key system, parties to communicate with each other 
have pre-shared key.  In addition, the public key is known to everyone in order to join the 
network using asymmetric key cryptography. While a wired network is supported by 
strong secure infrastructure, it is difficult for wireless networks to be as strongly secured. 





Table 11 and Figure 5 illustrate how many references focus on each of the 
identified problems.  Fifty-six references related to the key management problem were 
identified.  Subsequently, they were divided into three categories: WNs, WSNs, and 
MANETs.  Seven references were related to WNs, twenty-one references were related to 
WSNs, and twenty-eight references were related to MANETs.  In all wired network 
references, the key distribution problem was identified.  In all wireless network 
references key distribution, limited resources, insufficient and weak relationship 
standardization were identified.  In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), key distribution, 
different secret scheme, limited resources, and key recovery were identified.  MANETs 
references primarily deal with key distribution and increasing cost or key management. 
In Table11, WNs have a greater occurance of problems 1, 4, and 5 than any other 
network. This means that key distribution, limited resources, and insufficient standard are 
main problems in WNs. WSNs have a greater occurance of problems 1, 3, and 6 than any 
other network. This means that key distribution, different secret scheme, and difficult key 
recovery are main problems in WSNs. MANETs have a greater occurance of problem 1 
and 7 than any other network. This means that key distribution and increasing cost are 
main problems in MANETs. In all of three wireless networks, the key distribution is a 
main problem in deploying secure network. Figure 5 graphically displayed the results 





 WN (7) WSN (21) MANET (28) 
Problem 1 7 17 23 
Problem 2 5 5 12 
Problem 3 2 15 10 
Problem 4 6 11 4 
Problem 5 6 5 6 
Problem 6 1 14 11 
Problem 7 1 4 20 
Problem 8 3 6 9 
Table 11. References Identifying Key Management Problems 
 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of Key Management References by Problem 
 
4.3. Factors Affecting Key Management  
4.3.1. Overview 
In order to provide the critical factors of key management, twenty-eight references 
related to key management were used (See Appendix B).  The critical factors of key 




Additionally, we present the major factors in each secure wireless network from related 
fifty-six (See Appendix C). 
 
4.3.2. Critical Factors of Key Management 
Key management schemes are usually evaluated by the number of total keys the 
system must maintain, the number of keys each user receives, the size of public 
information, the time required to derive keys for access classes, and work needed to 
perform when the hierarchy or the set of users change (Atallah, 2005). The efficiency of a 
centralized key management scheme is primarily measured by re-key overhead at the key 
server that is defined as the average number of re-key messages transmitted by the key 
server to users per key updating, the re-key overhead at users that is defined as the 
average number of re-key messages received by the users per key updating, and storage 
overhead that is defined as the average number of keys stored at the key server and the 
users (Zhang, 2004). 
A security domain is a collection of systems (servers, devices, and so on) that 
share a common set of keys and are attached to an administered network. Security 
domains provide a useful approach for dealing with logical keying structures for data 
protection in large-scale systems in which many objects must be protected (Michener, 
2000). 
Harris (2003) explains the three principles and six rules of key management. The 
principles are following: Key should not be in clear-text outside the cryptography device. 
All of key distribution and maintenance should be automated and hidden form the user. 




rules are following: The key length should be long enough to provide the necessary level 
of protection. Keys should be stored and transmitted by secure means. The key’s lifetime 
should correspond with the sensitivity of the data it is protecting. The more the key is 
used, the shorter its lifetime should be. Keys should be backed up or escrowed incase of 
emergencies. Keys should be properly destroyed when their lifetime comes to an end. 
The most important design criteria for a key management system are listed below 
(Fumy, 1993). 
 
1. Minimize the number and complexity of trusted mechanisms involved. Especially, 
minimize the involvement of central mechanisms. 
2. Minimize physical activity, e.g., the use of couriers should be kept at a minimum 
(i.e., nonexistent if possible). This requirement also implies that for registration, 
entities should not have to travel far (for large systems, this suggests a hierarchical 
approach). 
3. Minimize the need for physical security, e.g., the number and size of tamper-
resistant devices, or the number of secure channels required. 
4. Achieve maximum flexibility with regard to specific key distribution protocols and 
specific cryptographic algorithms. 
5. Achieve maximum robustness (e.g., self-synchronization when keys are updated). 
6. Ensure that if any one entity is dishonest, that entity may be exposed. 





4.3.3. Result and Analysis 
The critical factors of key management that I identified are summarized in Table 
13 below. 
 
1. Key management is evaluated by the number of key, the information size, required 
time, needed work. 
2. Security domains provide a useful approach for dealing with key management. 
3. Key should not be in clear-text outside the cryptography device. 
4. All of key distribution and maintenance should be automated and hidden form the 
user. 
5. Backup copies should be available and easily accessible when required. 
6. Minimize the number and complexity of trusted mechanisms and physical activity, 
and the need for physical security 
7. Achieve maximum flexibility and robustness 
8. Ensure that if one is dishonest, it may be exposed 
Table 13. The Critical Factors of Key Management 
 
There are many references that explain which key management philosophy is 
better in a particular network environment and how to manage key secrecy effectively.  
However, there are no abstract factors which seem to influence all wireless networks.  
Due to their unique characteristics, each network type is suitable for different 
environment.  Wireless network (WNs) are used in the situation where there is 




environment which does not require a lot of resources and computation capabilities. The 
network environments such as dynamic topology and no infrastructure make it possible to 
emerge the mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs).  Table 14 and Figure 6 together 
summarize the fact that there are no dominating factors. Therefore, it is important to 
identify the characteristics of the network environment before considering a particular 
key management methodology. 
Table 14 and Figure 6 show that there are no main dominating factors. Most 
factors influenced each of the secure wireless network. Moreover, these illustrate that 
some factors which affect the particular wireless network are not main factors in other 
wireless networks. Therefore, it is possible to solely suggest particular factors affecting 
general wireless network. 
 
 WN (7) WSN (21) MANET (28) 
Factor 1 7 20 24 
Factor 2 6 17 14 
Factor 3 1 18 14 
Factor 4 4 3 22 
Factor 5 3 12 17 
Factor 6 4 7 6 
Factor 7 5 15 6 
Factor 8 3 17 3 






Figure 6. The Percentage of Key Management References Identifying Critical Factors 
 
4.4. Key Management Solutions in Secured Networks 
4.4.1. Overview 
In this section, we will examine and discuss key management solutions in detail.  
Each key management solution will be explained and its strengths and weaknesses will 
be discussed.  Finally, we will make suggestions which solution is suitable in each secure 
network environment. 
 
4.4.2 Key Management Solutions 
4.4.2.1. Partially Distributed Certificate Authority (PDCA) 
Using a (k, n) threshold, Zhou (1999) proposed this solution in order to distribute 
the services of the certificate authority to specialized server nodes. Each of these nodes 
has a capability to generate a partial certificate using their share of the certificate signing 





The system contains three types of nodes; client, server and combiner nodes. The 
client nodes are the normal users of the network while the server and combiner nodes are 
part of the certificate authority. The server nodes are responsible for generating partial 
certificates and storing certificates in a directory structure allowing client nodes to 
request for the certificates of other nodes. The combiner nodes which are also server 
nodes are responsible for combining the partial certificates into a valid certificate. 
Although not stated implicitly by the authors the system also has an administrative 
authority which will be termed the dealer. The dealer is the only entity in the system that 
has knowledge of the complete certificate signing key . CAsk
Every node in the network has a public/private key pair and it is the 
responsibility of the dealer to issue the initial certificate for the nodes public key as well 
as distributing the public key  of the certificate authority which is needed to verify 
the certificates. 
CApk
The certificate authority as a whole has a public/private key pair,  /  of 
which the public key is known to all network nodes. The private key , is shared 
among the server nodes according to Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (Fokine, 2002).  
CApk CAsk
CAsk






Figure 7. Partially Distributed Certificate Authority (Fokine, 2002) 
 
4.4.2.2. Fully Distributed Certificate Authority (FDCA) 
This solution is introduced by (Luo, 2000; Kong, 2001; Luo, 2002). In order to 
distribute an RSA certificate signing key to all nodes in the network, a (k, n) threshold 
scheme is used. It also uses verifiable and proactive secret sharing mechanisms to protect 
against denial of service attacks and compromise of the certificate signing key. The 
service of a certificate authority is distributed to a set of specialized server nodes. By 
using secret sharing, each of these nodes can generate partial certificates and by 
combining enough of them a valid certificate can be created. 
In this solution, the capabilities of the CA are distributed to all nodes in the ad 
hoc network, see Figure 8. Any operations requiring the CA’s private key  can only 





grouped as certificate related services and system maintenance services. The certificate 
related services include certificate renewal and revocation. 
The system maintenance services include incorporating joining nodes into the 
CA, i.e. provide them with their share of the CA’s private key . This service is called 
share initialization. The system maintenance also includes proactively updating the shares 
of the CA’s private key to protect it from being compromised. This service is termed 
share update. 
CAsk
The availability of the service is based on the assumption that every node will 
have a minimum of k one-hop neighbors and that the nodes are provided with a valid 
certificate prior to their joining the network. The system then provides services to 
maintain and update these initial certificates (Fokine, 2002). 
 
 





4.4.2.3. Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) 
There are different possibilities of authentication, which use either a Trusted 
Third Part (TTP) or a Chain of Trust. Recently, a lot of research has been interested in the 
field of Zero Knowledge Proofs. In theory, Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) is introduced 
by (Goldwasser, 1991). This method provides a good solution to node identification. Zero 
Knowledge Proofs allow one party to prove its knowledge of a secret to another party 
without revealing any information of the secret itself.   
Suppose that Alice knows a fact. She wants to convince Bob that she knows P, but 
she does not trust Bob. Thus, Alice does not want to reveal nay more knowledge to Bob 
than is necessary. What Alice needs is a zero-knowledge proof of P. 
For example, suppose that Alice wants to prove to Bob that she really is Alice. 
Suppose for convenience that there is some authority that verifies identities. One 
possibility is that the authority could issue Alice identification. If this were contained on 
a device such as a smart card, Alice could simply show it to Bob. However, if Alice and 
Bob are communicating over a network, then Alice’s identifying information would have 
to be transmitted to Bob over the network. On receiving it, Bob could use it to 
impersonate Alice. Even if Bob were trusted, an eavesdropper such as Alice’s adversary 
Carol could do the same. 
This situation also arises commonly in computer access control: Bob might then be a 
host computer or network server, and Alice’s identification might be a password. If Alice 
uses her password to identify herself, her password is exposed to the host software as 
well as eavesdroppers; anyone who knows this password can impersonate Alice. It is thus 




information. More generally, we need a scheme through which Alice can prove to Bob 
that she possesses something such as passwords without having to reveal it. Such a 
scheme is an example of a zero-knowledge proof. In fact, this example is the major 
practical use of zero-knowledge that has been suggested to date. 
Here is one way that such a system could be organized. The authority decides on a 
number N used for everyone; for example, take 77N = . Everyone knows this number. 
The authority may then choose, for example, two numbers that form an ID for Alice. 
Suppose these are {58, 67}. Everyone knows Alice’s ID. The authority then computes 
two other numbers {9, 10} that are given to Alice alone; she keeps these private. The 
latter numbers were chosen because  and . 29 58 1 (mod 77)× ≡ 210 67 1 (mod 77)× ≡
Now, Alice can identify herself to Bob by proving that she possesses the secret number 
{9, 10} without revealing them. Each time she wishes to do this, she can proceed as 
follows. 
She can choose some random numbers such as {19, 24, 51} and compute 
219 53 (mod 77)≡  
224 37 (mod 77)≡  
251 60 (mod 77)≡  
Alice then sends {53, 37, 60} to Bob. Bob chooses a random 3 by 2 matrix of 0’s 




E =  




0 119 9 10 36 (mod 77)× × ≡  
1 024 9 10 62 (mod 77)× × ≡  
1 151 9 10 47 (mod 77)× × ≡  
Alice sends {36, 62, 47} to Bob. Finally, Bob can check to see that Alice is who she 
says she is. He does this by checking that 
2 0 136 58 67 53 (mod 77)× × ≡  
2 1 062 58 67 37 (mod 77)× × ≡  
2 1 147 58 67 60 (mod 77)× × ≡  
The original numbers {53, 37, 60} that Alice sent reappear. Actually, this doesn’t 
really prove Alice’s identity; she could have been an impersonator. But the chances of an 
impersonator succeeding would have been only 1 in 64. 
In an actual system, the number N would have been much larger (for example, 160 
digits). Also, Alice would have been assigned an ID consisting of more number, for 
example, 4, by the authority, with a secret also consisting of four numbers. Furthermore, 
Alice would have generated more random numbers, for example, 5, to send to Bob. The 
ID numbers, secret numbers, and random numbers would have been about as large as N. 
This would have reduced an impersonator’s chances of cheating successfully to about 1 
in a million (more precisely ) if 4 and 5 are the parameters, which certainly would 






4.4.2.4. Self Issued Certificates (SIC) 
This solution is proposed by Hubaux (2001). This provides a public key 
management solution similar to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) (Garfinkel, 1995) in the sense 
that certificates are issued by the users themselves without the aid of any certification 
authority.  
This solution, like PGP, deals with the problem of distributing public keys in an 
authenticated manner. Unlike traditional PKI solutions, in PGP the public keys aren’t 
certified by some trusted third party, e.g. a CA. Instead each user has the capability of 
certifying the public keys of other users. It is then up to each user to determine how much 
trust to place in a specific certificate. Figure 9 illustrates a simple example of how PGP 
works. Bob has issued a certificate to Chris thus stating that  really is the public 
key belonging to Chris. Alice has also issued a certificate to Bob, indicating that  is 
really the public key belonging to Bob. Alice also trusts Bob not to issue any false 
certificates, thus Alice will trust any certificates issued by him. Therefore having 
 and , Alice can verify that  is authentic. She can then 
securely communicate with Chris even though they have never met (Fokine, 2002). 
Chrispk
Bobpk






Figure 9. Example of a certificate chain (Fokine, 2002) 
 
In PGP, public key servers, i.e. certificate directories are used to distribute 
certificates; however in ad hoc networks no such servers are available and therefore the 
solution proposed by Hubaux (2001) relies on the users to distribute and store the 
certificates themselves. Each user stores a small number of certificates that have been 
issued. When two users wish to authenticate each others’ public keys, they try to find a 
certificate chain using only the certificates stored in their combined local certificate 
repositories (Fokine, 2002). 
 
 





4.4.2.5. Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) 
Asokan (2000) introduced a password authenticated group key agreement 
protocol. He considered a collaborative network scenario where a group of people wishes 
to establish a secure wireless network during a meeting. In order to obtain such a 
security, a written password is selected. The protocol used in this solution is based on the 
Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol.  
The meeting members have no means of authenticating the other members using 
e.g. digital certificates. Therefore a simple password is chosen and e.g. written on a 
whiteboard. Using this weak password the members can engage in the password 
authenticated Hypercube protocol which results in them sharing a strong secret. The key 
agreement protocol needs to be authenticated to protect against active attacks, e.g. man-
in-the-middle attacks. 
A number of group key establishment protocols are compared along with the 
Hypercube protocol. The nodes participating in the protocol are arranged as the vertices 
in a d-dimensional cube, a hypercube. The protocol then consists of d rounds of two-party 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange. During each round dj ,,1…=  a node performs the two-
party key exchange with its neighbor in the th dimension. In the first round each node i 
uses his own secret  as the exponent. In the following rounds the key obtained from the 
previous round is used as the secret exponent. 
:j
ix
Figure 11 illustrates the Hypercube protocol where the number of participants is 
four, i.e. . In the first round nodes 1 and 2 perform a two-party Diffie-Hellman key 





(3, 4) share a common secret  and . In the second and final round nodes 1 and 3 
perform a two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange, as do nodes 2 and 4. The key 
exchange in the previous round is now used as the secret exponent in the Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange. E.g. node 1 sends  to node 3 and node 3 sends  to 
node 1. After the second round is complete all four nodes share a secret k (Fokine, 2002). 
2,1k 4,3k
pg k mod2,1 pg k mod4,3
 
 




Both Partially Distributed Certificate Authority (PDCA) and Fully Distributed 
Certificate Authority (FDCA) use the concept of (k, n) threshold in order to distribute the 




generate partial certificates and allow client nodes to request for the certificates of other 
nodes.  For this reason, it is required to select the special nodes. On the other hand, 
FDCA allows each node to certificate themselves without any special nodes. Strong 
certificates may be not expected depending on the function of each node.  Zero 
Knowledge Proof (ZKP) allows identifying without revealing any information related 
secret.  Although this requires less computation power, this may result in increasing 
overheads as increasing users.  Self Issue Certificates (SIC) manage the key distribution 
in a similar fashion to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).  It does not require infrastructure, but 
the initial phase is required.  Finally, Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) 
makes meeting members to share strong secret using weak password. However, it is 





 Advantage Weakness 
PDCA 
The solution is suitable for planned, 
long-term ad hoc networks. Since it is 
based on public key encryption it 
requires that the all the nodes are 
capable of performing the necessary 
computations. 
This solution requires that a server- 
and organizational/administrative 
infrastructure is available and 
therefore is only applicable to a subset 
of ad hoc network applications. 
FDCA 
This solution is aimed towards 
planned, long-term ad hoc networks 
with nodes capable of public key 
encryption. However, since the 
service is distributed among all the 
nodes when they join the network, 
there is no need to elect or choose any 
specialized server nodes. 
A larger number of shares are exposed 
to compromise since each node has its 
own share as compared to only the 
specialized server nodes in the 
partially distributed solution. 
ZKP 
ZKPs typically require significantly 
less computing power than traditional 
identification paradigms, which 
makes them especially appealing for 
ad hoc networks. 
The problem with this proof is that it 
affords interaction between prover 
and verifier. 
It is means an increase of overheads 
in communication between the parties 
involved in the authentication process.
SIC 
The main benefit of this solution is 
that it doesn’t require any form of 
infrastructure neither routing, server 
or organizational/administrative. 
It requires an initial phase during 
which its effectiveness is limited and 
therefore it is unsuitable for short-
term networks. 
PAKE 
Using the weak password the 
members, they are able to share a 
strong secret. 
This is a group-oriented solution since 
it doesn’t allow for authentication of 
individual nodes. 
Table 15. Advantages and Weaknesses of Solutions 
 
From the advantages and weaknesses of each solution, we suggest which 
network is a suitable solutions. Table 16 illustrates the comparison in each wireless 
network. This table shows which solution may be more suitable for a given wireless 
network.  PDCA and FDCA are suitable for WSNs and MANETs since the nodes in the 
network function as a router. ZKP is suitable for WNs and MANETs since it requires less 




required, many problems may occur in WSNs.  PAKE have limitations using WSNs and 
MANETs where there is no infrastructure to support security services. Table 16 explains 
which solution is suitable to apply to each network environment. 
 
 WN WSN MANET 
PDCA  √ √ 
FDCA  √ √ 
ZKP  √ √ 
SIC √  √ 
PAKE √   





 V. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
5.1. Overview 
In chapter 4, we examined the most important characteristics of implementing 
security in wireless network environments.  We also identified critical factors which 
determine if a key management methodology is effective in a given network 
environment.  We identified and discussed common problems encountered when 
deploying key management and discussed possible solutions. In this chapter, we will 
apply the knowledge we gained in chapter 4 and discuss them in the context of answering 
the research questions. Finally, we will present the findings of the research, the 
significance of research findings, and provide recommendations for future research. 
 
5.2. Discussion 
In chapter 1, we presented the primary research question and five related 
investigative questions in order to assess and identify existing key management 
techniques in secure communication network and to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses inherent in their design. The primary research question to be answered was 
“What are characteristics in using Key Management in wireless network?” and five 
investigated questions are below. 
1) What are the characteristics of various secure wireless  communications? 
2) What are the problems of implementing secure wireless network? 
3) What are the critical success factors in deployment of a secure wireless network? 




5) What is the advantages/weakness of each cryptography technique? 
 
The first question is what are the characteristics of various secure wireless 
communications?  In order to answer this question, we investigated the characteristics of 
various network environments.  Generally, Wireless Networks (WN) have infrastructure 
to support security. The networks are easy and flexible to establish, but they are 
vulnerable to suffer from potential attack. Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) have unique 
characteristics such that low-power, self-power, and low cost. However, the sensor nodes 
have limited sources. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) establish the temporary 
network without infrastructure. Due to this characteristic, this network is more flexible 
than wireless network, and has dynamic topology. However, this has critical problem of 
security. 
The second question is what are the problems of implementing secure wireless 
network?  The problems we identified in implementing secure network focused on the 
issues related to key management. The major problems identified are key distribution and 
the lack of resources such as storage and computational capability to enable encryption.  
In conventional networks, key distribution is centralized, uses fixed infrastructure, and is 
deployed by the organization to support the network.  In contrast, the wireless network 
environment creates difficulties due to it lack of infrastructure.  In addition, the nodes of 
wireless network typically have limited resources which severely limits the possible 
cryptographic solutions.  Thus, if it is desired to implement strong security in a wireless 
network, the nodes in the network should be designed with sufficient storage and 




The third question is what are the critical success factors in deployment of a 
secure wireless network?  In order to overcome the stated problems, we looked for 
critical issues when implementing key management.  In order to secure a network, one 
must consider how key management is implemented.  A review of the relevant literature, 
well defined policies, procedures, and processes to support key generation, key storage, 
key distribution, key updating, key revocation, and certificate service must be defined.  In 
order to realize effective key management, it is important to identify the characteristics 
and problem of network environment and to employ appropriate solution in the network. 
The fourth question is what types of cryptography are used to secure wireless 
network?  This research identified several solutions used in securing network. The 
partially distributed certificate authority and fully distributed certificated authority 
employed the concept of (k, n) threshold.  The zero knowledge proof is novel identity 
technique which proves its knowledge of a secret to another without revealing any 
information. Self issued certificate issues certificate without any aid of certification 
authority is similar to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).  Finally, password authenticated key 
exchange is authenticated group key agreement protocol using password. 
The fifth question is what is the advantages/weakness of each cryptography 
technique?  We examined the advantage and weakness of each solution. Partially 
distributed certificate authority and fully distributed certificate authority are designed to 
be suitable for ad hoc networks. Zero knowledge proof requires less computing power, 
but the network overhead is increased as the participants are increased. Self issued 




an initial phase is preceded. In password authenticate key exchange, the member of a 
group are able to share a strong secret using the weak password. 
 
5.3. Conclusion 
The objective of research is to provide guidelines for successful implementation 
in secure wireless communication network.  This research effort was an attempt to look 
for the critical factors in implementing key management in various wireless network 
environments in order to support secure communication in military operation. 
In this research, we have found that secure communication must be supported by 
strong key management.  In addition, when secure communications are constructed, the 
network environment should be identified and appropriate security methods should be 
provided.  Even if a technically sound secure communications is constructed, the 
underlying security can be easily compromised without strong key management.  It is 
recommended that WSN and MANET nodes be designed with increased computational 
and storage capability to support stronger cryptographic mechanisms. 
 
5.4. Significance 
The research finding have identified best practices and guidelines used when 
securing a wireless communications environment.  A comparison between cryptographic 
solutions in terms of their strength and key management complexity was provided to 
enable the best selection for a given application.  The research findings can aid in 
deploying secure communications in the military operations, law enforcement, and 





5.5. Future Research 
This research focused only on the wireless network environment. A broader study 
which examines all network topologies would provide additional insight into problems 
and solutions in key management. 
Future research could explore the military communication environment in detail 
and possible compare and contrast with the non-military communication environment. 
This would prove beneficial because of the unique characteristics of military 
communication could be identified and the possible solutions could be suggested. This 
work could provide a similar analysis to this study with the intent of providing effective 
guidelines to implement securing military communication network. 
 
5.6. Summary 
Key management issues are very important in secure communications network. 
Since existing key management solutions are based on fixed networks, advanced wireless 
network technologies such as wireless sensor network and mobile ad hoc network require 
more interests and effort to apply to military network.  In this chapter, we answered the 
research questions we formulated and identified important guidelines when constructing a 
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